Mayor Players and Coordination in Games of Strategic Complementary and Incomplete Information

, 黑料传送门 Booth 

Major players play significant roles in coordinating agents in games with strategic complementarities (substitutabilities) and incomplete information. While studies of global games introduce strategic complementarity and incomplete information, little is understood about how major players affect the game outcomes. In a series of projects, I plan to investigate the role of major players in both static and dynamic settings, and demonstrate the how the results can be potentially applied to a few areas: (a) government policy intervention in financial markets (bank runs, stock market crisis, currency attacks) and in technology adaptation (including industrialization across sectors, subsidizing new industries, sector transformation dynamics); (b) the role of major institutional investors in financial markets; (c) coordination issues in political economy where either a few candidates are trying to win public support (and action), or a dominant political voice trying to establish international coordination.